Abstract. We identify conditions for separating signaling equilibria where attributes are randomly related to costs. Under discrete attributes, a necessary and sufficient condition is the ordering of the cost distributions conditional on attributes by the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP). An equivalent condition is the monotone ordering of the cost elasticities of these distributions. Under a continuum of attributes, a necessary and sufficient condition is ordering by the cost elasticity of the cost density functions with respect to the original probability measure and with respect to a probability measure modified by the "attribute payoff function." This condition is the equivalent, under a continuum of attributes, to the condition of ordering by the MLRP. We, thus, introduce the definition of Generalized MLRP which orders posterior distributions induced by distributions as well as by particular realizations. We examine a "Spence labor market" in which education costs are randomly related to productivity. JEL Classification Code: D82
Introduction
The seminal Spence/Riley signaling model assumes that costs and attributes are related by a one-to-one correspondence. [(Spence (1973) , Riley (1975) ]. Thus, in equilibrium, separation by costs implies separation by attributes. In many real-world situations, however, there is no one-to-one correspondence between costs and attributes. Costs of acquiring education are related not only to one's productivity but also, for example, to one's wealth level, family support, and athletic and performing arts talents. When costs and attributes are randomly related, perfect separation by (unobservable) attributes is impossible. Depending on the random relation between costs and attributes, however, a separating-by-costs 1 signaling equilibrium might
arise. In such equilibria, though separation by attribute works "on average," there will be some high-attribute individuals (with high costs) who receive lower payoffs than those of some low-attribute individuals (with low costs). In this paper, we describe conditions for such equilibria under both, a discrete attributes and a continuum of attributes.
To simplify the exposition, we conduct our analysis within Spence's (1973) "job market" framework but assume a random relation between costs and attributes.
Employees privately draw at random signaling costs (per year costs of acquiring education) and attributes (constant marginal productivities). The probability distributions are common knowledge. Employers publicly announce a wage schedule that is strictly increasing in employees' education level (number of years of acquired education). Employees signal their attributes to employers by choosing signals (education levels) that maximize their net income (wages minus their total signaling costs [costs of acquiring education]). In a separating signaling equilibrium employees with lower costs choose higher education levels. Because every level of attribute (cost) might be associated with every level of cost (attribute), full separation by attributes is impossible. The finest possible separation is by costs, thus, we actually consider a separating-by-cost signaling equilibrium. In a fully separating-by-cost signaling equilibrium, employees with a certain education level have a distribution of productivities. This is in contrast with Spence's equilibrium where a certain education level induces a certain productivity level. Thus, Spence's equilibrium is a special case of our equilibrium, where the ranges of the distributions of attributes induced by costs has degenerated to single atoms.
A separating-by-cost signaling equilibrium exists if there exists a wage schedule such that: i) lower cost employees choose higher education levels (separation), ii) employees maximize their net income (employees rationality), and iii) employers receive on average the productivities implied/induced by the wage levels (employers rationality).
We first examine the case of a continuum of costs and a binary attribute, but conjecture that the analysis carries to a model with a finite number of possible attribute values. We find that a necessary condition for a separating-by-cost signaling equilibrium is ordering by First-Order Stochastic Dominance 2 (FOSD) of the cost distributions conditional on attributes. A necessary and sufficient condition is the ordering of these distributions by the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). An equivalent necessary and sufficient condition is the monotone ordering of the cost elasticities of these distributions. See Milgrom (1981) for an examination of the informational role of the MLRP.
We then examine the case where both costs and attributes can take a continuum of values. We demonstrate that a necessary and sufficient condition for separating-by-cost signaling equilibria is the ordering by the cost elasticities of the cost density functions with respect to the original probability measure and with respect to a probability measure modified by the "attribute payoff function." This condition is the equivalent, under a continuum of attributes, to the condition of ordering by the MLRP of the cost distributions conditional on discrete attributes. We thus introduce the definition of Generalized MLRP. While the MLRP ranks posterior distributions induced by realizations from a certain domain, the GMLRP ranks posterior distributions induced by distributions over a certain domain. Clearly if the inducing distributions degenerate to single atom, GMLRP becomes MLRP. The GMLRP is thus necessary and sufficient for the separating equilibrium under a continuum of attributes.
We present our latter results in terms of the ratio of the probability distribution functions of the cost under the original and a modified probability measure. This not only allows for a concise presentation, but also has an intuitive appeal: we change the original measure by multiplying each attribute realization by its "full information" reward/wage. Thus, both employees cost distributions and their "relevance" to employers determine the nature of the equilibrium.
The intuition behind the equilibrium conditions is appealing. Clearly, in equilibrium, employees who receive higher pay should provide higher productivity. . Employees know their own productivity type and realized cost, but these are unobservable to others. An alternative assumption that employees know their realized costs but not their productivity types might be less economically appealing but equally supports the paper results. All probability distributions are common knowledge.
A representative employer who pays the competitive wage wishes to discriminate among employees based on their productivity. He draws inferences about employees' productivity from their signals, education level measured in years, and sets employees wages to be a function of the perceived productivity given an education level.
Let the level of a signal that an employee sends be s,
, and ) (⋅ b a strictly monotonic and twice continuously differentiable signaling function that maps costs, c, into signals s. In a separating-by-cost signaling equilibrium, employees with cost c signal s = b(c). Let W(s) denote the wage offered to employees who signal s. Then, this wage is 
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The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (2.2) is the wage offered to the employee, and the second term is the total signaling cost. Employees choose signal level ŝ to maximize their value function. Note that in a separating signaling equilibrium, employees choose a signal ŝ which is equal to s = b(c), thus, in this case,
We aim to construct a separating-by-cost signaling equilibrium, or, a differentiable equilibrium where 1) rational employees choose signals that maximize their value function, 2) rational employers offer wages that equal employees' conditional marginal productivity, and 3) employees with lower costs acquire higher education levels (monotone signaling or separation). We impose the condition of employer's rationality by setting the wage function as in Equation (2.1). Given employees' value function, we now need to identify a signaling rule b that induces the satisfaction of the two other equilibrium properties, separation and employees' rationality. We summarize the results in the following lemma, proposition, and corollaries. 
Lemma 2.1. A necessary condition for the existence of a differentiable separating-bycost signaling equilibrium is the existence of a signaling rule b(c), that obeys the system,
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Equilibrium Under a Continuum of Attributes
We will now present a version of model in the previous section under a continuum of attributes. We will emphasize those features of the model that are different here and assume that all else is as in the previous section. We now assume that employees first draw a realization of productivity from a real valued positive random variable θ distributed according to a probability measure θ µ with a corresponding density function ( ) f θ . Then, employees draw a per-unit signaling cost We now proceed with an analysis "along the equilibrium path:" we use the Spence/Riley conditions for a signaling equilibrium to identify the conditions for a signaling equilibrium under random costs. We offer an alternative derivation of this 6 To simplify the exposition, we assume mathematical conditions for separation by cost that are more restricting than necessary. For example, we can allow b'(c) = 0 for some c. 7 These are the necessary and sufficient conditions for employees value maximization under the cost structure specified in Equation (3.2). Different cost structures would induce corresponding conditions. Note that ( ) N c is a function of both the "attribute payoff function," in our case simply θ, and the probability distribution of attributes conditional on costs. Note that all the paper results hold for the case where the "attribute payoff function" is some We will now derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibrium. We start with the first-order conditions. Differentiating ( ) N c , defined in Equation 
We define a new probability measure . Thus,
and if E is the expectation operator under θ
Performing the differentiation on the right-hand side of Equation (3.9) yields
and substituting Equation (3.10) in Equation (3.4) we get
Under the appropriate boundary conditions, for Condition (C.1) to hold, the third multiplicand in Equation (3.11) has to be negative. It is easy to show that the requirement that this third multiplicand is negative is equivalent to the ordering of the cost elasticity of the cost density functions with respect to the original and the new probability measures. If we divide each term of the multiplicand by c each term becomes the cost elasticity of the density function under the corresponding probability measure. That is,
Let subscripts denote partial derivative with respect to the subscript argument. We have now proved the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A necessary condition for the existence of a separating-by-cost
signaling equilibrium is the existence of a signaling rule ( ) b ⋅ , which satisfies
where, for economic reasons, we require
We now formalize the role of the ordering by cost elasticity of the cost density functions. 2) From Equation (3.14), the ordering by cost elasticity is necessary and sufficient for employees' rationality. 3) From Equation (3.10) the ordering by cost elasticity is necessary and sufficient for employers' rationality. Because the ordering by cost elasticity is necessary and sufficient for the three equilibrium conditions, it is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium. □
The ordering of cost densities under a continuum of attributes corresponds to the ordering by the MLRP under discrete attributes, both in form and implications.
While the MLRP ranks posterior distributions induced by particular realizations taken from a certain domain, the ranking under a continuum of attributes is of posterior distributions induced by distributions over a certain domain. Clearly, if the inducing distributions degenerate to a single atom, the ranking under a continuum of attributes becomes MLRP. We, thus, suggest to call the ranking under a continuum of attributes Generalized MLRP (GMLRP). This makes the MLRP and GMLRP, the necessary and sufficient conditions for separating signaling equilibria under discrete and a continuum of attributes, respectfully.
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Summary and Conclusion
We used Spence's job market framework to identify conditions for a separating signaling equilibrium where costs and attributes are randomly related. The ordering of the distributions of costs conditional on attributes by First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOC) is necessary for a separating equilibrium. As an aggregate measure, ordering by FOC is not sufficient to prevent localized "cheating,"
thus not sufficient for a separating equilibrium. The ordering of the costs distributions conditional on attributes by the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), a measure defined over densities, is necessary and sufficient for a separating equilibrium under discrete attributes, and the ordering by the cost elasticity of the cost density functions is necessary and sufficient under a continuum of attributes. The latter condition corresponds to an MLRP that ranks posterior distributions induced by distributions rather than the usual MLRP that ranks posterior distributions induced by realizations. We thus suggest the definition of the Generalized MLRP (GMLRP). The GMLRP, then, is the necessary and sufficient condition for a separating signaling equilibrium under a continuum of attributes.
Our model results and intuition carry over to other signaling models. It is relevant to all signaling situations where costs and attributes might not be deterministically related.
APPENDIX A Proof of Lemma 2.1
Restating Equation (2.1),
By Bayes Rule,
Substituting Equation (A.2) into Equation (A.1) yields
In equilibrium, employees maximize the value function V defined in Equation (2.2). 
APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE DERIVATION OF SECTION 3 RESULTS
We now offer an alternative derivation of Section 3 results, independent of the one in the body of the paper. Here we do not use the Spence/Riley conditions. The analysis follows that of Section 2. We assume that employers assign markups as if employees signal "truthfully" using a strictly monotonic and twice continuously differentiable signaling rule ( ) b ⋅ . We then determine the implications of this assumption on the underlying distributions of costs and attributes. This will lead to the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions on these distributions under which the employers assumption that employees use a strictly monotonic signaling rule is self fulfilling. In other words, the conditions under which the wage function that employers use induces employees to signal truthfully when maximizing their value function.
We use the paper's definitions and notation. If an employee sends a signal ŝ , an employer uses the inverse signaling function Recalling that ( ) f c is positive, we apply Bayes' rule to Equation (B.1). This 
